In this paper, we investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we analyze a sequential attack based on optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between consecutive signal states emitted by the source. We show that this attack can provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from sequential attacks where the eavesdropper aims to identify the state of each signal emitted by the source unambiguously.
I. INTRODUCTION
The main security threat of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols based on weak coherent pulses (WCP) arises from the fact that some signals contain more than one photon prepared in the same polarization state. In this situation, the eavesdropper (Eve) can perform, for instance, the so-called Photon Number Splitting (PNS) attack on the multi-photon pulses [1] . As a result, it turns out that the BB84 protocol [2] with WCP can give a key generation rate of order O(η 2 ), where η denotes the transmission efficiency of the quantum channel [3, 4] .
To obtain higher secure key rates over longer distances, different practical QKD schemes, that are robust against the PNS attack, have been proposed in recent years. One of these schemes is the so-called decoy-states [5] , where the sender (Alice) randomly varies the mean photon number of the signal states that are forwarded to the receiver (Bob). This method can deliver a secure key rate of order O(η). Another possibility is based on the transmission of two non-orthogonal coherent states together with a strong reference pulse [6] . This technique also provides a key generation rate of order O(η) [7] . Finally, another potential approach is to use a differential-phaseshift (DPS) QKD protocol [8, 9] . In this scheme, Alice sends to Bob a train of WCP whose phases are randomly modulated by 0 or π. On the receiving side, Bob measures out each incoming signal by means of an interferometer whose path-length difference is set equal to the time difference between two consecutive pulses. In this last case, however, a secure key rate of order O(η) has only been proven so far against a special type of individual attacks where Eve acts and measures photons individually, rather than signals [9] , and also against a particular class of collective attacks where Eve attaches ancillary systems to each pulse or to each pair of successive pulses sent by Alice [10] . While a complete security proof of a DPS QKD protocol against the most general attack is still missing, recently it has been shown that sequential attacks [9] already impose strong restrictions on the performance of this QKD scheme with WCP. For instance, in [11, 12, 13] it was proven that the long-distance implementations of DPS QKD reported in [14, 15, 16, 17] would be insecure against a sequential attack based on unambiguous state discrimination (USD) of Alice's signal states [18, 19, 20] .
In this paper, we investigate a novel sequential attack where Eve realizes unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between Alice's signal states, and we obtain ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by a DPS QKD scheme as a function of the error rate in the sifted key, and the mean photon number of the signals sent by Alice. It states that no key distillation protocol can provide a secret key from the correlations established by the users. Moreover, we show that this attack can provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from a sequential attack where Eve performs USD of each signal state emitted by Alice [11, 12, 13] .
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we describe in more detail a DPS QKD protocol. Then, in section III, we present a sequential attack against this QKD scheme based on optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between Alice's signal states.
Here we obtain upper bounds on the performance of a DPS QKD scheme as a function of the error rate in the sifted key and the mean photon number of Alice's signal states. Finally, section IV concludes the paper with a summary. The manuscript contains as well one appendix with additional calculations.
II. DIFFERENTIAL-PHASE-SHIFT QKD
The basic setup is illustrated in figure 1 . Alice prepares first a train of coherent states |α and, afterwards, she modulates, at random and independently every time, the phase of each pulse to be 0 or π. As a result, she produces a random train of signal states |α or | − α that are sent to Bob through the quantum channel. On the receiving side, Bob uses a 50 : 50 beam splitter to divide the incoming pulses into two possible paths and then he recombines them again using another 50 : 50 beam splitter. The time delay introduced by Bob's interferometer is set equal to the time difference ∆t between two consecutive pulses. Whenever the relative phase between two consecutive signals is 0 (±π) only the photon detector D0 (D1) may produce a "click" (at least one photon is detected). For each detected event, Bob records the time slot where he obtained a click and the actual detector that fired.
Once the quantum communication phase of the protocol is completed, Bob uses a classical authenticated channel to announce the time slots where he obtained a click, but he does not reveal which detector fired each time. From this information provided by Bob, together with the knowledge of the phase value used to modulate each pulse, Alice can infer which photon detector had clicked at Bob's side each given time. Then, Alice and Bob agree, for instance, to select a bit value "0" whenever the photon detector D0 fired, and a bit value "1" if the detector D1 clicked. In an ideal scenario, Alice and Bob end up with an identical string of bits representing the sifted key. Due to the noise introduced by the quantum channel, together with possible imperfections of Alice and Bob's devices, however, the sifted key typically contains some errors. Then, Alice and Bob perform error-correction to reconcile the data and privacy amplification to decouple the data from Eve. (See, for instance, [21] .)
III. SEQUENTIAL ATTACKS AGAINST DIFFERENTIAL-PHASE-SHIFT QKD
A sequential attack can be seen as a special type of intercept-resend attack [9, 11, 12, 13] . First, Eve measures out every signal state emitted by Alice with a detection apparatus located very close to the sender. Afterwards, she transmits each measurement result through a lossless classical channel to a source close to Bob. Whenever Eve obtains a predetermined number of consecutive successful measurement outcomes, this source prepares a new train of non-vacuum signal states that is forwarded to Bob. Otherwise, Eve typically sends vacuum signals to Bob to avoid errors [22] . Whether a measurement result is considered to be successful or not, and which type of signal states Eve sends to Bob, depends on Eve's particular eavesdropping strategy and on her measurement device. Sequential attacks transform the original quantum channel between Alice and Bob into an entanglement breaking channel [23] and, therefore, they do not allow the distribution of quantum correlations needed to establish a secret key [24] .
The first sequential attack against a DPS QKD protocol was introduced very briefly in [9] . In this proposal, Eve employs a detection apparatus equivalent to Bob's setup. A successful result is associated with Eve obtaining a click in her measurement device. This click identifies unambiguously the relative phase (0 or ±π) between two consecutive pulses emitted by Alice and, therefore, it reveals Eve the bit value encoded by the sender. A failure corresponds to the absence of a click. However, since Alice emits WCP with typical average photon number quite low, so is the probability that Eve obtains a successful result in this scenario. In order to increase Eve's successful probability other sequential attacks have been proposed more recently [11, 12, 13] . These attacks are typically based on Eve realizing USD of each signal state emitted by Alice, since Eve can always access a local oscillator that is phase-locked to the coherent light source employed by the sender [13] . In particular, when Eve identifies unambiguously a signal state emitted by Alice, i.e., she determines without error whether it is |α or | − α , then she considers this result as successful. Otherwise, she considers it a failure. In [11] it was shown that this class of sequential attacks can provide tighter upper bounds on the performance of a DPS QKD protocol than those derived from a sequential attack where Eve uses the same measurement apparatus like Bob.
In this section, we introduce an improved version of the sequential attack proposed in [9] , and we investigate again the situation where Eve tries to identify the relative phases between Alice's signal states unambiguously. As a result, it turns out that the attack we propose can provide stronger limitations for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those reported in [11, 12, 13] . In our analysis we consider a conservative definition of security, i.e., we assume that Eve can always control some flaws in Alice's and Bob's devices (e.g., the detection efficiency, the dark count probability and the dead-time of the detectors), together with the losses in the channel, and she exploits them to obtain maximal information about the shared key.
A. Optimal unambiguous discrimination between relative phases
In a DPS QKD protocol Alice sends to Bob a train of WCP each of them prepared in the state |α or | − α . These coherent states can be expressed in some orthogonal basis {|0 , |1 } as follows
where we assume, without loss of generality, that the coefficients a and b are given by
with µ α = |α| 2 denoting the mean photon number of Alice's signal states. That is, a and b satisfy: a ∈ R, b ∈ R, a 2 + b 2 = 1, and a > b when µ α = 0. The state of a block of M consecutive WCP emitted by Alice, that we shall denote as |ψ( x M ) , can be written as
with the coefficients a and b given by (2) , and where the vector x M = (x 1 , ..., x M ), with x i ∈ {0, 1}, contains the information about the value of the phase (0 or π) imprinted by Alice in each pulse within the block. In order to access to the relative phase information encoded in a block of signals sent by Alice, however, it is not necessary to completely identify the vector x M . For instance, the relative phase between pulse N and pulse N − 1 in |ψ( x M ) , with 2 ≤ N ≤ M , is simply given by 0 (±π) when x N ⊕ x N −1 = 0 (1). In general, for any given state |ψ( x M ) , there exists always another state |ψ(
, that has precisely the same M − 1 relative phases as |ψ( x M ) . This means, in particular, that the problem of determining the relative phases of Alice's signal states can be formulated as a discrimination problem between 2 M−1 mixed states given by
with the coefficient x M = 0. That is, the vector x M has now the form
with x i ∈ {0, 1}. This last condition arises because
1). The normalization term
1 2 that appears in (4) is due to the fact that all the states |ψ( x M ) have equal a priori probabilities.
To distinguish between the signals states given by (4), we shall consider that Eve follows a USD strategy. That is, the constraint is that the measurement employed by Eve should never wrongly identify a state ρ( x M ), but it can provide sometimes an inconclusive result [18, 19, 20] .
The goal is to keep the fraction of inconclusive outcomes as low as possible.
Let the set of binary vectors V y,M , with y ∈ {A, B}, be defined as V y,M = {(n 1 , ..., n M ) | n i ∈ {0, 1}, and M i=1 n i even if y = A, odd if y = B}, and let Y M denote the subspace spanned by the orthogonal states {|n 1 , ..., n M }, with the vectors (n 1 , ..., n M ) ∈ V y,M . The signal states ρ( x M ) given by (4) can be written in a block-diagonal form as
where the probabilities p y,M are given by
with the vector n M ≡ (n 1 , ..., n M ), and where the states |ψ y ( x M ) have the form
That is, the signals |ψ
This means, in particular, that we can always assume, without loss of generality, that Eve's measurement strategy includes an initial step which projects the mixed states ρ( x M ) onto the orthogonal subspaces A M and B M . This projective measurement is characterized by the following two operators:
with y ∈ {A, B}.
That is, it outputs the state |ψ y ( x M ) with probability p y,M .
The question of discriminating the 2 M−1 mixed states given by (4) can then be reduced to the problem of distinguishing 2 M−1 pure states |ψ y ( x M ) . To discriminate between the signals |ψ y ( x M ) , we shall consider a measurement strategy which can involve at most M −1 steps. Before providing the exact details of the measurement, let us sketch very briefly its principal parts. Eve starts by performing a filter operation on |ψ y ( x M ) . If the filter operation succeeds, Eve obtains x M−1 ⊕ x M . That is, Eve learns with certainty the relative phase between the first two pulses in the block. Moreover, this filter operation also outputs a quantum state which still contains complete information about the remaining M − 2 relative phases within the block. On the contrary, if the filter operation fails, the value of x M−1 is not accessible anymore, and Eve cannot obtain the first two relative phases (i.e., x M−1 ⊕ x M , and x M−2 ⊕ x M−1 ) within the block. In this last case, however, the filter operation outputs a state which contains information about the remaining M − 3 relative phases within the block. Eve repeats the same procedure several times, but now applied to the quantum state provided by the filter operation in the previous step. To gain full information about all the relative phases contained in |ψ y,M ( x) , Eve needs to obtain M −1 consecutive successful filtering results.
The main motivation to select such a particular implementation of a USD measurement is closely related to Eve's eavesdropping strategy, which will be introduced in section III B. The principal idea behind this method is that, with some finite probability, Eve can always determine the value of some relative phases in |ψ y ( x M ) , even if she is not able to identify all of them. Moreover, as we show in A, it turns out that this measurement strategy is optimal, i.e., it minimizes the probability of obtaining an inconclusive result when distinguishing all the M − 1 relative phases of Alice's signal states. Next, we provide the technical details of Eve's measurement.
The set of M − 1 possible filter operations employed by Eve is defined by the following two Kraus operators: 
Let |φ y ( x N ) denote a quantum state of the form
for all x M given by (5) . Let x N −1 denote the vector that is formed by the first N − 1 elements of x M . For any N satisfying 2 ≤ N ≤ M , the signal states given by (12) can be written as a function of |φ y ( x N −1 ) and |φȳ( x N −1 ) , withȳ = B when y = A andȳ = A when y = B, as
up to a global phase.
Suppose now that the filter operation defined by (10) receives as input the state |ψ y ( x M ) ≡ |φ y ( x M ) . The probability of getting a successful result, that we shall represent as p succ,y,M , can be calculated as 
. We obtain |φ succ,y ( x M ) = |φȳ( x M−1 ) ⊗ |ψ y,M , with the state |ψ y,M given by |ψ y,M = (
], up to a global phase. That is, the relative phase between pulse M and pulse M − 1 is now completely accessible to Eve. She only has to measure the state |ψ y,M in the orthogonal basis |± = ( √ 2) −1 (|0 ± |1 ) to learn its value. On the contrary, the probability of obtaining a failure, that we shall denote as p f ail,y,M , can be calcu-
Whenever the filter operation failed, the resulting normalized filtered state, that we shall denote as |φ f ail,y ( x M ) , can be calculated as
. We obtain |φ f ail,y ( x M ) = |φ y ( x M−2 ) ⊗ |00 , up to a global phase. That is, if Eve fails when filtering the state |φ y ( x M ) , then the value of x M−1 is not accessible to her anymore, and Eve cannot obtain the relative phase information between pulse M and pulse M − 1, and also between pulse M − 1 and pulse M − 2, within the block.
Once the first filter operation finished, Eve is left with a quantum state which contains the signal |φȳ( x M−1 ) if the filter succeeded, or the signal |φ y ( x M−2 ) if it failed. Then, she can repeat the same procedure again, and filter these signal states to try to obtain x M−2 ⊕ x M−1 if the original state was |φȳ( x M−1 ) , or x M−3 ⊕ x M−2 if it was |φ y ( x M−2 ) . In general, whenever a filter operation given by (10) receives as input the state |φ y ( x N ) , with 2 ≤ N ≤ M , then the probability of getting a successful result is given by
If the filter operation succeeded, the resulting normalized filtered state has the form
with the signal |ψ y,N given by
up to a global phase. On the contrary, the probability of obtaining a failure can be expressed as
with the probabilities p A,0 ≡ 1 and p B,0 ≡ 0. In this last case, the resulting normalized filtered state is given by
up to a global phase. Let us now calculate the probability that Eve learns the first k ∈ [1, M − 1] relative phases of ρ( x M ). As we have seen above, to obtain the relative phase between pulse N and pulse N − 1 within a block of M signals sent by Alice, Eve has to successfully filter a state of the form |φ y ( x N ) . Let p succ,N denote the probability that Eve obtains the value of x N −1 ⊕ x N conditioned on the fact that Eve has access to a signal |φ y ( x N ) , with y ∈ {A, B}. This probability can be written as
where p (19) we obtain that p succ,M−2 satisfies p succ,M−2 = 2b 2 . Following a recursive argumentation, it is straightforward to show that
for all N satisfying 2 ≤ N ≤ M , and where in the last equality we have used (2) . This means, in particular, that the probability that Eve learns the first k ∈ [1, M − 1] relative phases of ρ( x M ) can now be expressed as
As already mentioned before, it can be proven that this measurement is optimal, i.e., it minimizes the probability of having an inconclusive result when distinguishing all the relative phases of Alice's signal states. (See Appendix A.)
B. Eavesdropping strategy
For simplicity, we shall consider that Eve treats all the signal states sent by Alice as a single block of signals, and she tries to discriminate each relative phase within the block. Whenever she identifies unambiguously a predetermined number of consecutive relative phases sent by Alice, i.e., she determines without error whether each relative phase is 0 or ±π, she considers this sequence of measurement outcomes successful. Otherwise she considers it a failure. We define the integer parameter M min as the minimum number of consecutive relative phases that Eve needs to correctly identify in order to consider the sequence of measurement outcomes successful. More precisely, if k ≥ 0 denotes the total number of consecutive relative phases unambiguously identified by Eve before she obtains an inconclusive result, then, whenever k > M min , Eve prepares a new train of signal states that is forwarded to Bob. On the other hand, if k < M min Eve sends to Bob k + 2 vacuum states, where the last vacuum state corresponds to Eve's inconclusive result. Finally, whenever k = M min we shall consider that Eve employs a probabilistic strategy that combines the two previous ones. In particular, we assume that Eve sends to Bob a new train of signal states with probability q and, with probability 1 − q, she sends to Bob M min + 2 vacuum states. That is, the parameter q allows Eve to smoothly fit her eavesdropping strategy to the observed data [11] .
Moreover, for simplicity, we define the integer parameter M max > M min as the maximum number of consecutive unambiguous discrimination successful results that Eve can obtain in order to send to Bob a train of signal states. That is, whenever Eve determines unambiguously M max consecutive relative phases within a block of them then she discards the next two phases, sends to Bob a train of signal states, and begins again the measurement process of the remaining phases. The reason to discard two consecutive relative phases in this scenario is just to guarantee that between any two blocks of signal states sent by Eve there always exists, at least, one vacuum state. Specifically, suppose, for instance, that after M max successful results, Eve's filter operation outputs, with probability p y N , a state |φ y ( x N ) given by (12) . For N > 2, the state |φ y ( x N ) can be written as
up to a global phase. If now Eve discards subsys-tem C, the resulting signal state can be expressed as
After some calculations, and using the fact that p y N = p y,N (see Section III A), we obtain that this state is of the form given by (6), with M = N − 2. That is, the value of x N −1 is not accessible anymore, but Eve can start again her measurement strategy on ρ( x N −2 ).
Let us now introduce the type of signal states that Eve forwards to Bob when she obtains M min ≤ k ≤ M max consecutive successful measurement outcomes. To guarantee that Eve's presence remains unnoticeable to the legitimate users, she needs to select these signal states such that they can reproduce the statistics expected by the legitimate users after their measurements. For this, we shall consider the standard version of a DPS QKD protocol, where Alice and Bob only monitor the raw bit rate (before the key distillation phase) together with the time instances in which Bob obtains a click. It was shown in [13] that the main limitation on the class of signal states that Eve can send to Bob in this scenario arises from the dead-time of Bobs detectors. In particular, to be able to mimic the expected dead-time of the detectors, Eve has to select trains of signal states that can produce only one click on Bob's side within a dead-time period [25] . To achieve this goal, we shall assume that whenever Eve identifies k consecutive relative phases encoded by Alice then she chooses her signal states, that we denote as |ψ k e , containing only one photon distributed among k + 1 temporal modes. These modes correspond to k + 1 consecutive pulses sent by Alice, i.e., the time difference between any two consecutive temporal modes is set equal to the time difference ∆t between two consecutive pulses. Specifically, we shall consider that the states |ψ k e are given by [12, 13] 
with the coefficients A (k) n ∈ C and where the normalization condition k+1 n=1 |A (k) n | 2 = 1 is always satisfied. The angles θ n are selected such that they reproduce the relative phases identified by Eve's measurement, i.e., θ n − θ n−1 , with 1 < n ≤ k + 1, is equal to the relative phase between pulse n and pulse n− 1 sent by Alice. The operatorâ † n represents a creation operator for one photon in temporal mode n, and the state |vac refers to the vacuum state. The superscript k labeling the coefficients A (k) n emphasizes the fact that the value of these coefficients may depend on the number of temporal modes contained in |ψ k e . Eve also appends some vacuum states to each signal |ψ k e . The main idea behind this procedure is to guarantee that whenever Bob obtains a click on his detection apparatus, then he cannot obtain any other click afterwards during a period of time at least equal to the deadtime of his detectors. The minimum number of vacuum states that Eve needs to send to Bob after each signal |ψ f c denote, respectively, the dead-time of Bob's detectors and the clock frequency of the system [13] . The minimum value of d arises from the case where Bob obtains a click in the last possible temporal mode. Whenever Eve forwards to Bob a state |ψ k e together with 1 + d vacuum states then she also has to discard some extra relative phases of |φ y ( x N ) according to the procedure explained above before she begins again with her measurement of the remaining relative phases within the block.
In section III A we showed that, given ρ( x M ), the probability that Eve learns the first k ∈ [1, M − 1] relative phases of ρ( x M ) is given by p k with
This means, in particular, that the probability that Eve sends to Bob a train of signal states |ψ k e , together with 1 + d vacuum states, is given by
with p given by (24) . Similarly, we shall denote with p v (k) the probability that Eve sends to Bob k +2 vacuum states. This probability is given by
We illustrate all these possible cases in figure 2 , where we also include the different a priori probabilities to be in each of these scenarios. Next, we obtain an expression for the gain, i.e., the probability that Bob obtains a click per signal state sent by Alice, together with the quantum bit error rate (QBER) introduced by Eve with this sequential attack. The analysis is analogous to that included in [13] , but now taking into account the a priori probabilities p s (k) and p v (k) given by (25) and (26), respectively.
C. Gain
The gain, that we shall denote as G, can be expressed as G = N clicks /N s , where N clicks represents the average total number of clicks obtained by Bob, and N s is the total number of signal states sent by Alice. The parameter N clicks can be expressed as N clicks = (N s /N e )N e clicks , with N e denoting the average total number of pulses of the signal states sent by Eve (see figure 2) , and where N e clicks represents the average total number of clicks obtained by Bob when Eve sends to him precisely these signal states. With this notation, the gain of a sequential attack can be written as
Let us start by calculating N e clicks . Whenever Eve sends to Bob a signal state |ψ 
The analysis to obtain N e is similar. A signal state |ψ k e followed by 1+d vacuum states can be seen as containing k+2+d pulses. On the other hand, the number of vacuum pulses alone that Eve sends to Bob can vary from 2 to M min + 2 (see figure 2) . Adding all these terms together, and taking into account their a priori probabilities, we obtain that N e can be written as
with N e clicks given by (28). The gain G can be related with a transmission distance l for a given QKD scheme, i.e., a distance which provides an expected click rate at Bob's side given by G. This last condition can be written as
where η det represents the detection efficiency of Bob's detectors, and η t denotes the transmittivity of the quantum channel. In the case of a DPS QKD scheme, the value of η t can be derived from the loss coefficient γ of the optical fiber measured in dB/km, the transmission distance l measured in km, and the loss in Bob's interferometer L measured in dB as
From (30) and (31), we find that the transmission distance l that provides a gain G is given by 
The parameter N e clicks was calculated in the previous section and it is given by (28). In order to obtain an expression for N e errors , one can distinguish the same cases like in the previous section, depending on the type of signal states that Eve sends to Bob. Whenever Eve sends to Bob a signal state |ψ k e followed by 1 + d vacuum states (Case A in figure 2 ), the average total number of errors in this scenario, that we shall denote as e(k), is given by
On the other hand, if Eve sends to Bob only vacuum states (Case B in figure 2 ) Bob never obtains an error. This means, in particular, that N e errors can be expressed as
E. Evaluation
The sequential attack introduced in section III B can be parametrized by the minimum number M min of consecutive unambiguous discrimination successful results that Eve needs to obtain in order to consider the sequence of measurement outcomes successful, the maximum number M max of consecutive successful results that Eve can obtain in order to send to Bob a train of signal states, the value of the probability q, i.e., the probability that Eve actually decides to send to Bob the signal state |ψ n (solid line). The dashed line represents a sequential USD attack [13] . The mean photon number of Alice's signal states is µα = 0.2, and the parameter d = 500. The triangles represent experimental data from [17] .
Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6 show a graphical representation of the gain versus the QBER in this sequential attack for different values of the mean photon number µ α of Alice's signal states, and the parameter d. It states that no key distillation protocol can provide a secret key from the correlations established by the users above the curves, i.e., the secret key rate in that region is zero. In these examples we consider the optimal distribution for the state coefficients A (k) n , i.e., the one which provides the lowest QBER for a given value of the gain. This distribution was obtained in [13] , where it was shown that the vector of optimal state coefficients (A
k+1 ) coincides with the normalized eigenvector associated with the maximal eigenvalue of a (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix with ones only on the first off-diagonals and zeros elsewhere. These figures assume that M max is fixed and given by M max = 25, and we vary the parameters M min < M max and q ∈ [0, 1]. These examples also include the case of a sequential attack where Eve realizes USD of each signal state sent by Alice [13] , together with experimental data from [14, 15, 16, 17] . For instance, in the experiment reported in [17] the dead-time of Bob's detectors is t d = 50 ns and the clock frequency of the system is f c = 10 GHz. We obtain, therefore, that d = ⌈t d f c ⌉ = 500. (See figure 3. ) Similarly, in the experiments realized in [14, 15, 16] According to these results, we find that the sequential attack proposed in section III B can provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from a sequential attack where Eve performs USD of each signal state emitted by the source. Basically, this result arises due to the different a priori n (solid line). The dashed line represents a sequential USD attack [13] . The mean photon number of Alice's signal states is µα = 0.17, and the parameter d = 50. The triangles represent experimental data from [14] . (See also [16] .) n (solid line). The dashed line represents a sequential USD attack [13] . The mean photon number of Alice's signal states is µα = 0.16, and the parameter d = 50. The triangle represents experimental data from [14] . (See also [16] .) probabilities of Eve sending to Bob a train of signal states |ψ k e , together with 1 + d vacuum states, in each of these two possible attacks. In particular, while in the attack introduced in section III B these probabilities are given by p s (k), in a sequential USD attack these probabilities have the form p s (k)p, with p given by (24) . Note that in this last case Eve has to discriminate the state of k + 1 consecutive signals sent by Alice unambiguously. n (solid line). The dashed line represents a sequential USD attack [13] . The mean photon number of Alice's signal states is µα = 0.2, and the parameter d = 50. The triangles represent experimental data from [15] . (See also [16] .)
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of a differentialphase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on weak coherent pulses. A sequential attack consists of Eve measuring out every coherent state emitted by Alice and, afterwards, she prepares new signal states, depending on the results obtained, that are given to Bob. Whenever Eve obtains a predetermined number of consecutive successful measurement outcomes, then she prepares a new train of non-vacuum signal states that is forwarded to Bob. Otherwise, Eve can send vacuum signals to Bob to avoid errors. Sequential attacks transform the original quantum channel between Alice and Bob into an entanglement breaking channel and, therefore, they do not allow the distribution of quantum correlations needed to establish a secret key.
Specifically, we have investigated a sequential attack where Eve realizes optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between Alice's signal states. When Eve identifies unambiguously the relative phase between two consecutive signal states sent by Alice, then she considers this result as successful. Otherwise, she considers it a failure. As a result, we obtained ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by a DPS QKD scheme as a function of the error rate in the sifted key, and the mean photon number of Alice's signals. It states that there exists no improved classical communication protocol or improved security analysis which can turn the correlations established by the users into a secret key. Moreover, our analysis indicates that this attack can provide tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than those derived from sequential attacks where Eve performs unambiguous state discrimination of each signal state emitted by the source.
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APPENDIX A: OPTIMALITY OF EVE'S MEASUREMENT
In this appendix we show that the unambiguous discrimination measurement presented in section III A is optimal, i.e., it minimizes the probability of having an inconclusive result when distinguishing all the relative phases between Alice's signal states. For that, we calculate the maximal probability of unambiguously determining all the relative phases contained in the signal states ρ( x M ) given by (6) , and we show that this probability coincides with that provided by the measurement introduced in section III A.
As already mentioned before, due to the special block structure of the signal states ρ( x M ), we can always assume, without loss of generality, that Eve first projects ρ( x M ) onto the orthogonal subspaces A M and B M and, afterwards, she measures the relative phase information contained in |ψ y ( x M ) , with y ∈ {A, B}.
The set of states |ψ y ( x M ) ∈ Y M constitutes a socalled geometrically uniform (GU) set [26, 27] . That is, these states are defined over a group of unitary matrices and they can be generated by a single generating vector. In particular, let G be the finite group of 2 M−1 unitary matrices U ( x M ) defined as U ( x M ) = 1 n1,...,nM =0 (−1)
with x M given by (5). If we denote as 0 M = (0 1 , ..., 0 M ) the vector that has all its M elements equal to zero, then the states |ψ y ( x M ) can always be written as |ψ y ( x M ) = U ( x M )|ψ y ( 0 M ) , with |ψ y ( 0 M ) being the generating vector of the set. Let Φ y,M denote the matrix whose columns are the state vectors |ψ y ( x M ) , and let Φ * y,M represent its conjugate transpose. It was proven in [27] that the maximal probability of correctly distinguishing between GU pure states with equal a priori probabilities is given by the smallest eigenvalue of Φ y,M Φ * y,M . The matrices Φ y,M , with y ∈ {A, B} and M ≥ 3, can be written, respectively, as
